Constitutional Law by Cooksey, James Peter
Denver Law Review 
Volume 62 
Issue 1 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 12 
February 2021 
Constitutional Law 
James Peter Cooksey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
James Peter Cooksey, Constitutional Law, 62 Denv. U. L. Rev. 91 (1985). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided several cases involving constitutional issues. Some of the cases
cast new light on old problems in interpreting the constitution; others
reinforced principles previously enunciated in settled precedent; and in
others, the appellants failed to raise valid constitutional challenges.
This article focuses primarily on first amendment cases. The lead
case addresses the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute that at-
tempted to prohibit school teachers from advocating or engaging in
"public homosexual conduct."' Other important Tenth Circuit consti-
tutional law cases touch on such diverse areas as a Wichita obscenity
ordinance,2 Jewish school teachers' freedom of religion rights,3 and the
Oklahoma Take-over Bid Act.4 And, to the chagrin of non-smokers
working in smoke-filled offices throughout the Tenth Circuit, the court
of appeals refused to use the Constitution to ban smoking in the work-
place, thereby rejecting appellants claim to a constitutional right to
think.
5
I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: NATIONAL GAY TASK FORCE V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION
A. Facts
In National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education,6 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the question of whether a statute 7 which punishes school
1. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), prob.
juris. noted, 105 S. Ct. 76 (Oct. 1, 1984) (No. 83-2030) (arguments heardJanuary 14, 1985;
decision pending). See infra notes 6-52 and accompanying text.
2. M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 53-70
and accompanying text.
3. Pinsker v. Joint School Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra
notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
4. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Servs. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra
notes 136-152 and accompanying text.
5. Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 128-135 and
accompanying text.
6. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.), prob. juris noted, 105 S. Ct. 76 (Oct. 1, 1984) (No. 83-
2030) (arguments heard January 14, 1985; decision pending).
7. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-103.15 (1981). This statute provides:
1. "Public homosexual activity" means the commission of an act defined in
Section 886 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, if such act is:
a. committed with a person of the same sex, and
b. indiscreet and not practiced in private;
2. "Public homosexual conduct" means advocating, soliciting, imposing,
encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a
manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the
attention of school children or school employees; and
3. "Teacher" means a person as defined in Section 1-116 of Title 70 of the
Oklahoma Statutes.
B. In addition to any ground set forth in Section 6-103 of Title 70 of the
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teachers for "public homosexual activity" 8 and "public homosexual con-
duct" 9 violates the Constitution. Oklahoma law, as written in state stat-
utes and subsequently interpreted by the state courts, defined
homosexual "activity" as including the commission of oral or anal sod-
omy. 10 Homosexual conduct, however, was statutorily defined as "ad-
vocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting public or
private homosexual activity."' Punishment for public homosexual con-
duct or activity by a teacher included refusal to hire or rehire, suspen-
sion or dismissal.'
2
The National Gay Task Force (NGTF), a political action group
which promotes the rights of homosexuals and which includes among its
membership teachers employed by the defendant school district, chal-
lenged the facial constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that the
section prohibiting homosexual activity deprived its members of the
right to privacy' 3 and equal protection under the law, 14 and that the law
was vague. 15 The appellants also contended that the section outlawing
public homosexual conduct was infirm in that it was overbroad, invading
freedom of speech.16 Finally, NGTF argued that the statute violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment' 7 because it reflected
Oklahoma Statutes, a teacher, student teacher or a teacher's aide may be re-
fused employment, or reemployment, dismissed, or suspended after a find-
ing that the teacher or teachers' aide has:
1. Engaged in public homosexual conduct or activity; and
2. Has been rendered unfit, because of such conduct or activity, to hold a
position as a teacher, student teacher or teachers' aide.
C. The following factors shall be considered in making the determination
whether the teacher, student teacher or teachers' aide has been rendered un-
fit for his position:
1. The likelihood that the activity or conduct may adversely affect students
or school employees;
2. The proximity in time or place of the activity or conduct to the teacher's,
student teacher's, or teachers' aide's official duties;
3. Any extenuating or aggravating circumstances; and
4. Whether the conduct or activity is of a repeated or continuing nature
which tends to encourage or dispose school children toward similar con-
duct or activity.
8. Id. In this statute, homosexual activity refers exclusively to the actual commitment
of an act defined in 21 OKLA. STAT., § 886 (1981), which states: "Every person who is
guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with mankind or
with a beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten (10)
years." In Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955), the Oklahoma
court construed § 886 as proscribing oral and anal copulation. The United States
Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), upheld a nearly identical Flor-
ida statute.
.9. See supra note 7. In this statute, public homosexual conduct refers not to the com-
mission of sodomy, but to the advocacy of homosexual activity as defined in note 7, supra.
10. See supra note 8.
11. See supra note 7.
12. See supra note 7.
13. Brief for the Appellant at 21-36, National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984).
14. Id. at 36-45.
15. Id. at 17-21.
16. Id. at 14-16.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I states, in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an





The Tenth Circuit, speaking through Judge Logan, upheld the sec-
tion of the law which permits the state to fire teachers for committing
indiscreet public acts of sodomy. 19 Although the court did not com-
ment extensively, it ruled that because the statute prohibits only public
homosexual activity, it does not violate any constitutionally protected
right to privacy.20 In response to the equal protection challenge, the
court ruled that since the choice of sexual partner has not been held to
be a suspect class,2 1 the state may reasonably discharge a teacher "for
engaging in an indiscreet public act of oral or anal intercourse."
22
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court in rejecting the
NGTF establishment of religion challenge with little comment other
than reference to Harris v. McCrae.2 3 In Harris, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that just because a law coincides or harmonizes
with a religious belief, it does not necessarily follow that the law was
inspired by that belief, citing for example that theJudaeo-Christian ethic
against stealing does not negate larceny laws.
24
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that the homosexual activity section
of the statute was not invalid for vagueness. 2 5 Relying on Village of Hoff-
man Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. ,26 the court stated that an
appellant must show that a challenged law is "impermissibly vague in all
its applications."' 2 7 Noting that the challenged statute defines public ho-
mosexual activity as the "commission of an act defined in Section 886 of
Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes," 28 and that Oklahoma courts have
construed this section as proscribing oral and anal intercourse, 29 the ap-
peals court ruled that the behavior prohibited by the statute is clearly
defined, and thus the law is not void for vagueness.
3 0
The section of the statute which proscribed advocating public ho-
mosexual conduct 3 l did not fare as well as the section outlawing public
homosexual activity. The court ruled that this section reached protected
speech.3 2 The trial court had also found that the statute forbade pro-
tected speech, but upheld its constitutionality by reading into it a "mate-
18. Brief for the Appellant at 46-47.
19. 729 F.2d at 1273.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1273 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
22. 729 F.2d at 1273.
23. 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
24. Id. at 319-320.
25. 729 F.2d at 1273. See supra notes 7 and 8.
26. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
27. 729 F.2d at 1273 (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497).
28. See supra note 3.
29. 729 F.2d at 1273 n.1 (citing Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558, 563 (Okl. Crim.
App. 1955)).
30. 729 F.2d at 1273.
31. See supra note 7.
32. 729 F.2d at 1274.
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rial and substantial disruption" test. 33 The Tenth Circuit ruled,
however, that it could read no such test into the statute, and thus found
it an unconstitutional invasion of free speech.
3 4
Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,3 5 the court acknowledged that first
amendment facial challenges based on overbreadth are "strong
medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort."'3 6 Neverthe-
less, the court felt compelled to invalidate the advocacy section of the
statute because it regulated pure speech,3 7 it has a "deterrent effect on
legitimate expression," 3 8 and because it would not be "readily subject
to a narrowing construction by the state courts."
'3 9
The court found that even though the statute sought to condemn
advocacy of a crime, the first amendment protects such speech so long
as the illegal activity is to take place at "some indefinite future time."
40
Only advocacy intended to incite imminent lawlessness is not so pro-
tected, the court noted, citing Brandenburg v. Ohio.4 1 The court observed
that a teacher appearing before the Oklahoma legislature to lobby for
homosexual rights, although exercising protected speech, would be sub-
ject to punishment under the statute if his advocacy came to the atten-
tion of his students or school employees. 4 2 Thus, under the statute, the
court noted, teachers necessarily must restrict their expression in order
to protect their jobs.
43
Recognizing that in some instances the state may restrict teachers'
freedom of speech,4 4 the court ruled that such a restriction is constitu-
tionally proper only when the speech creates a "material or substantial
interference or disruption in the normal activities of the school." 4 5 The
court went on to observe that the appellee had made no showing that
mere advocoacy would create such a disruption.
4 6
C. The Dissent
Judge Barrett, in a vigorous dissent, entirely rejected the majority's
33. Id. at 1272-73.
34. Id. at 1274.
35. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
36. 729 F.2d at 1274 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
37. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1982)).
38. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216
(1975)).
39. Id.
40. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973)).
41. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
42. 729 F.2d at 1274.
43. Id. at 1274 (citing Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975)).
44. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (teachers' interest
in commenting upon matters of public concern must be balanced against the State's inter-
est, as an employer in public employee efficiency); Childers v. Independent School Dist.
No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982) (public employee's first amendment rights of ex-
pression are protected unless the employer demonstrates that some restriction is neces-
sary to ensure effective employee performance or to prevent disruption of official
functions).
45. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Tinker v. Des Monies, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
46. 729 F.2d at 1274.
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constitutional overbreadth analysis, and would have upheld the
Oklahoma statute in its entirety. 4 7 Declaring sodomy to be "malum in
se," 48 Judge Barrett concluded that advocacy of homosexual conduct
merited no constitutional protection. 49 Not being protected speech, the
judge asserted that the state is not required to demonstrate that such
advocacy would cause a material or substantial disruption of school ac-
tivities. Rather, all the state need show was that "such advocacy is ad-
vanced in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will
encourage school children to commit the abominable crime against na-
ture." 50 The judge concluded that, regardless of the situs where made,
any public advocacy involved a substantial risk of reaching the ears of
school children, creating a danger that it would incite them to "partici-
pate in the abominable and detestable crime against nature."' 5 1 Such
speech, opined the judge, "is without First Amendment protection."
5 2
II. OBSCENITY: M.S. NEWS V. CASADO
5 3
In M.S. News Co. v. Casado,54 the Tenth Circuit considered a first
amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a proposed Wichita,
Kansas, obscenity ordinance. The case presented to the court two previ-
ously unraised questions: first, the constitutionality of incorporating a
modified Miller definition of "obscenity" into an ordinance designed for
the protection of children as an audience; 5 5 and second, the constitu-
tionality of protecting children from the display of materials which are
not legally obscene in the possession of an adult. Relying on a related
47. Id. at 1275 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1276. Judge Barrett defines malum in se as an act "immoral and corruptible
in its nature without regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the
state." Id.
49. Id. at 1276.
50. Id. at 1277.
51. Id. at 1276.
52. Id.
53. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lawrence K. Hoyt in
drafting this section of the article.
54. 721 F.2d at 1281 (10th Cir. 1983). The case also raised equal protection, prior
restraint, and sixth amendment issues. On each of these issues the court ruled against the
plaintiff news company. The equal protection claim, which arises frequently in conjunc-
tion with obscenity issues, was disposed of by directly applying Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (Supreme Court stated that "stemming the tide of commer-
cialized obscenity" is a legitimate state interest).
The court rejected outright the plaintiff's prior restraint claim, noting that the ordi-
nance penalizes violations of its terms, "[i]t does not require prior approval of the authori-
ties before any material can be distributed or displayed." 721 F.2d at 1292.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's sixth amendment argument that, because prose-
cutions under the ordinance are tried before the municipal court, the ordinance violates
the right to a jury determination of what constitutes contemporary community standards.
721 F.2d at 1293. The court determined that Kansas' "two-tier" adjudicatory system,
which provides an appellant the right to a trial de novo in the district court where trial by
jury may be requested, adequately affords an accused his right to a jury trial. Id. at 1294.
The court refused to accept plaintiff's argument that the application of the constitutional
obscenity test must, in the first instance, be by a jury. Id. at 1295.
55. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), a majority of five justices agreed on a
new definition of "obscenity" which is constitutionally acceptable for use in determining
when materials or speech are not entitled to first amendment protection. The decision
1984]
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but not clearly precedential Supreme Court decision, the Tenth Circuit
rejected in a logical manner each of the arguments raised against the
ordinance.
The plaintiff, a wholesale and retail distributor of publications, was
appealing the district court's dismissal of its request for injunctive and
declaratory relief against enforcement of the ordinance. 5 6 The ordi-
nance, if enforced, would render illegal the sale of sexually oriented
materials to minors and would limit the display of such materials. The
ordinance specifically required that material "harmful to minors" must
be kept behind devices commonly known as "blinder racks" so that the
lower two-thirds of the material would not be visible.
5 7
The Tenth Circuit first cited Ginsberg v. New York 58 for the general
principle that it is constitutionally permissible to accord minors a more
restrictive right to purchase sexually related materials than that given to
adults.59 The court then addressed the plaintiff's allegation that the
Wichita ordinance was void due to overbreadth and vagueness. Observ-
ing that the Ginsberg Court had upheld, in the face of vagueness and
overbreadth claims, a New York statute which similarly prevented the
sale of obscene materials to minors, the Tenth Circuit reconciled two
important factual differences between Ginsberg and the case at bar.60
First, the New York obscenity ordinance in Ginsberg had defined
materials "harmful to minors" by incorporating the definition of "ob-
scenity" as set forth in the now overruled Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
6 '
modifying each of the three elements of the Memoirs definition so that it
applied to minors.62 The Wichita ordinance, however, used the current
Miller definition of obscenity, modifying it in the same manner to derive
its definition of "harmful to minors."' 63 Because the Ginsberg Court had
held that such a modification to a constitutionally acceptable definition
did not cause the resulting definition to fail for overbreadth or vague-
modified the definitions previously set forth in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
The Miller guidelines are (a) "whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest" (quoting Roth), (b) "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the state law," and (e) "whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973).
56. 721 F.2d at 1285.
57. Id. at 1296, 1297.
58. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
59. 721 F.2d at 1285.
60. Id. at 1286.
61. 383 U.S. 413-18 (1966).
62. 721 F.2d at 1286 (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968)).
63. 721 F.2d at 1296. The Wichita ordinance defined as "harmful to minors" any
material or performance having the following characteristics:
(a) The average adult person applying contemporary community standards
would find that the material or performance has a predominant tendency to ap-
peal to a prurient interest in sex to minors; and
(b) The average adult person applying contemporary community standards
would find that the material or performance depicts or describes nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse in a manner that is patently
[Vol. 62:1
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ness, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, by implication, that the Wichita ordi-
nance should likewise be upheld against the vagueness and overbreadth
claims. 64
The second important difference between the Wichita and Ginsberg
ordinances was that the Wichita ordinance included the display prohibi-
tion. The Tenth Circuit held that although the prohibition was content-
based regulation, it was valid as a reasonable time, place and manner
regulation designed to further "the substantial governmental interest of
protecting minors from harmful adult material."' 65 The plaintiff's over-
breadth argument was therefore rejected. 6 6 The court noted that adults
were not deprived of access to the material, and minors were deprived
only of material that was obscene as to them.6 7 The court further rea-
soned that the display regulation could be categorized as governing
"speech plus conduct," rather than pure speech, thereby invoking the
requirement that the overbreadth of the challenged statute must be
"substantial" before invalidation is justified.6 8
The court rejected the plaintiff's vagueness claim by holding that
the ordinance's clearly defined obscenity standard gives each seller of
sexually oriented material sufficient notice of when displays must be re-
stricted. 69 The scienter provision in the ordinance was found to further
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what is
suitable for minors; and
(c) The material or performance lacks serious literary, scientific, educa-
tional, artistic, or political value for minors.
Id. at 1296. Compare the ordinance definition of "harmful to minors" with the Miller defi-
nition of obscenity presented at supra note 55.
64. 721 F.2d at 1286-87.
65. Id. at 1288 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-72 (1976)).
The Tenth Circuit rationale should not, however, be interpreted as allowing or en-
couraging content-based regulation of speech beyond the obscenity context. Unlike the
evolution of the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity which, since Miller, has appar-
ently reached a condition of stability (see supra note 55), the Supreme Court's position on
the validity of content-based regulation is in a state of flux. The plurality opinion in Ameri-
can Mini Theatres supported a broader use of content-based regulation, 427 U.S. at 63 &
n. 18, but Justice Powell, the swing vote, and Justice Stewart, with whom three Justices
joined in dissent, wrote that an ordinance discriminating between theatres solely on the
basis of the content of the films shown is unconstitutional. Id. at 75, 76, 86. Furthermore,
there has historically been a presumption against the validity of content-based regulations
as indicated by the recent Supreme Court decisions in Metromedia Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981), and Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 536 (1979). Therefore. MS. News should not be relied upon as authority for
content-based regulation of speech beyond the obscenity context. However, see FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978), which upholds a content-based regulation
designed to protect children from indecent forms of speech.
66. 721 F.2d at 1289. See also Dover News, Inc. v. City of Dover, 381 A.2d 752, 755
(1977) in which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire suggested that a properly written
display ordinance would be upheld as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction.
Compare American Booksellers v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 129 Cal. App. 3d 188,
204, 205, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 33, 38 (1983), ruling that a display ordinance was overbroad to
the extent it denied access of adults and minors to material that was not obscene to each
group respectively.
67. 721 F.2d at 1288-89.
68. Id. at 1289 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982)).
69. 721 F.2d at 1290.
1984]
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mitigate any claim of vagueness or lack of notice. 70
III. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The Tenth Circuit considered two cases in which appellants invoked
a freedom of religion argument to vindicate perceived invasions of con-
stitutional rights. In both cases, the appeals court rejected the claims of
the appellants.
A. Denver Post of The National Society of The Volunteers of
America v. NLRB.
7 1
The Volunteers of America (VOA) and its affiliated Denver chapter
is an organization whose stated purpose is to bring people to "a knowl-
edge of God."'7 2 Although the Denver chapter operates three chapels in
the metropolitan area, it also operates six social welfare facilities in coor-
dination with various state and local governmental agencies. 7 3 In 1981,
several of its social workers were the targets of an organizing effort by
the United Nurses, Professionals and Health Care Employees (the
Union). The Union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) requesting that it be certified as the bargaining agent for
VOA employees. VOA objected to the certification on the grounds that
it was a religious organization, and that its complex relationship with
various governmental levels, especially for funding and administration,
made negotiations for wages, hours, and conditions of employment with
a third party almost impossible. 74 Nevertheless, the NLRB certified the
Union, which subsequently won an election among VOA employees.
When the Union sought to negotiate a wages-and-hours contract,
VOA refused on the ground that the jurisdictional certification issued by
the NLRB was erroneous. The NLRB regional director issued a com-
plaint against VOA alleging violations of the National Labor Relations
Act. 7 5 Shortly thereafter VOA and the Union jointly filed a stipulation
requesting that the NLRB issue an order charging the VOA with a tech-
nical refusal to bargain. The sole purpose of the requested order was to
place VOA's objections to the NLRB certification before the Tenth
Circuit.
7 6
Before the appellate court, VOA cited NLRB v. Catholic Bishop7 7 as
authority for its refusal to bargain with the Union. In Catholic Bishop, the
United States Supreme Court rejected a bid by the NLRB to force a
union election in church schools, observing that "the 'obvious fact [is]
that the raison d'tre of parochial schools is the propagation of a reli-
70. Id.
71. 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 770.
73. Id. at 771 n.l.
74. Id. at 771.
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5) (1982).
76. 732 F.2d at 771.
77. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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gious faith.' ",78 This, the court ruled, would cause the NLRB, a govern-
mental organization, to become impermissibly entangled in church
affairs.79
The circuit court observed that, although the primary purpose of
the VOA is to help people find God through the social programs it ad-
ministers, the religious aim clearly is not the "central role . . . [of] the
programs themselves." 8 0 Thus, the court ruled that VOA was not enti-
tled to the same first amendment protection as that given parochial
schools. The court noted that, although all VOA officers are ordained
ministers, the staff of its various social work programs have no religious
training and provide no spiritual guidance to their clients. This, con-
cluded the court, is "a far cry from that of the parochial school teachers
in Catholic Bishop," and poses little potential for entangling the NLRB in
religious matters. 8 ' However, the court noted that if the VOA was using
funds received from federal and state sources for sectarian purposes, it
would raise "serious establishment questions under the First Amend-
ment, as well as the Colorado Constitution."1
8 2
The appellate court also ruled'against VOA's contention that it
should be exempt pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act provi-
sion which excludes governmental bodies from NLRB jurisdiction.
8 3
The court found that VOA was a private contractor rather than a gov-
ernmental agency. As such, it had sufficient control over wages, hours
and working conditions to bargain meaningfully with the Union. 84 Cit-
ing its decision in R. W. Harmon & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 5 the appeals court
ruled that whether an employer had sufficient control over employee
relations to bargain effectively is a question of fact, and that the NLRB
finding would not be disturbed so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence. 8 6 Thus, having ruled against VOA on both of its objections to
78. Id. at 503 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628 (1971) (Douglas, J.
concurring)).
79. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High School, 623 F.2d 818, 823 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981), in which the appeals court ruled that a first
amendment conflict arose because of "the suffusion of religion into the curriculum and the
mandate of the faculty to infuse the students with the religious values of a religious creed."
80. 732 F.2d at 772.
81. Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981), in
which the NLRB was upheld in ordering union elections in a church-operated home for
battered children. The court emphasized that the home was operated in the same manner
as secular child-care centers, hired employees without regard to religion, and received
substantial public funding. See also Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677
F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982).
82. 732 F.2d at 772 n.2.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
84. 732 F.2d at 774-75. But see Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB. 624
F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980), in which the court ruled against the NLRB on the grounds that
the hospital did not have sufficient control over employment relations to barguitt
meaningfully.
85. 664 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1981).
86. 732 F.2d at 774. See also NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403 k1947):
NLRB v. St. Louis Comprehensive Health Center, Inc., 633 F.2d 1268, 1272 (Sth Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
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the NLRB's findings, the court enforced the Board's order to bargain
collectively with the Union.
B. Pinsker v. Joint District Number 28J
87
The appellant, Gerald Pinsker, an Aurora, Colorado, school
teacher, and the Aurora Education Association, filed this suit against the
school district claiming a violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,8 8 and of
his first and fourteenth amendment rights to freedom of religion. 89
Pinsker alleged that the district's annual schedule is arranged so that
Christmas is not a school day, and that in most years Good Friday or
Good Friday afternoon are not school days.90 Jewish teachers, however,
must take personal leave or unpaid leave to celebrate Yom Kippur and
Rosh Hashanah. The appellants argued that this leave policy discrimi-
nates against Jewish teachers on religious grounds and burdens their
rights to free exercise of religion. 9 1
The appeals court observed that the collective bargaining contract
between the school district and its teachers provides for twelve days of
paid leave, two of which may be used for special purposes. Tradition-
ally, Jewish teachers who chose to celebrate Yom Kippur and Rosh
Hashanah have used their two days of special leave and one day of un-
paid vacation.
92
Citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,93 the court ruled that the
1964 Civil Rights Act 9 4 requires an employer to either make a reason-
87. 735 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1984).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). The applicable subparagraphs provide:
§ 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
§ 2000e. Definitions
(j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and prac-
tice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to rea-
sonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business.
89. 735 F.2d at 389.
90. Id.
91. Id. The parties to the suit stipulated that if Pinsker prevailed, any relief accorded
him would be extended to other Jewish teachers. Id. at 389 n. 1.
92. Id. at 390.
93. 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (Holding that the "intent and effect" of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j) was to require employers to make "reasonable accommodations, short of undue
hardship," for employee religious practices. According to the court, requiring an em-
ployer "to bear more than a de minimus cost" in order to accommodate employee religious
practices constituted "undue hardship." Id. at 84. See also McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc.,
571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). See supra note 88.
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able accommodation to an employee's religious beliefs or demonstrate
that such accommodation would be an undue hardship.9 5 But, the court
stated, reasonable accommodation does not mean that the employer
must do exactly what the employee wants, or cause the employee no
expense. Therefore, the court ruled that requiring a teacher to take oc-
casional unpaid leave "is not an unreasonable accommodation of teach-
ers' religious practices."
9 6
The plaintiffs also claimed that the leave policy burdened Pinsker's
right to free exercise of religion. The Tenth Circuit relied on Thomas v.
Review Board,9 7 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
burden on religion exists when the state puts substantial pressure on an
employee "to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."9 8 The
court held that loss of an occasional day's pay by a teacher does not
constitute a substantial burden, citing Braunfeld v. Brown.99
IV. MINOR PARTY BALLOT ACCESS AND MOOTNESS
In Thournir v. Buchanan, 0 0 the Tenth Circuit addressed appellant's
claim that a Colorado ballot access law' 0 ' violates article I, section 2 of
the United States Constitution. ' 0 2 Colorado law requires that if a per-
son is not affiliated with a political party recognized by the state, that
person must be a registered voter in the political subdivision he seeks to
represent for at least one year prior to the placing of his name in nomi-
nation.' 0 3 The law permits the transfer of current registration from
county-to-county within the state, but specifically denies transfer of
party affiliation from without the state.1°4
Eileen Thournir, a registered member of the Socialist Workers
Party in California, moved to Colorado in 1981 but failed to register her
95. 735 F.2d at 391 (citing as support Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hosp., 671 F.2d
141, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982)).
96. 735 F.2d at 391. However, the court's "reasonable accommodation" analysis
failed to address Pinsker's primary argument; namely, that the school board practiced in-
vidious discrimination because it accommodates Christian teachers by closing the schools
for Christian holidays, but requires Jewish teachers to take leave, paid or unpaid, to ob-
serve their religious holidays. The issue was not whether Pinsker was being reasonably
accommodated, but whether the school district invidiously discriminated between Jewish
teachers and Christian teachers.
97. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
98. Id. at 717-18.
99. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In this case the Court ruled that Sunday closing laws,
although causing economic loss to Jewish merchants, do not interfere with the free exer-
cise of religion.
100. 710 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983).
101. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-4-801(1) (i) (1973):
No person shall be placed in nomination by petition unless the person is a regis-
tered elector of the political subdivision or district in which the officer is to be
elected and unless he was registered as unaffiliated, as shown on the books of the
county clerk and recorder, for at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of
the petition . . ..
102. See infra note 112.
103. See supra note 101.
104. CoLo. REV. STAT. 1-2-219(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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party affiliation in Colorado until July of 1982.105 Thournir attempted
to run for Congress in the 1982 election, filing the petition required by
Colorado statute' 0 6 with the secretary of state. In September, appellee
Buchanan, then secretary of state, sued to have Thournir's name struck
from the ballot on the ground that Thournir had not been a registered
unaffiliated voter for the statutorily required time period.' 0 7 The Den-
ver District Court, on September 30, 1982, ordered Thournir's name
struck from the ballot.10 8 The Colorado Supreme Court, on October 1,
1982, declined to review the decision.' 0 9 On October 13, 1982, the ap-
pellant filed a section 1983 suit1 10 in federal district court seeking to
have her name restored to the ballot, and to recover damages and attor-
ney's fees.I I Thournir also sought to have the Colorado statute which
denied her access to the ballot declared unconstitutional.' 12
On October 15, 1982, the federal district court denied relief, treat-
ing the suit as a motion for a preliminary injunction against striking her
name from the ballot. The court did not reach the constitutional ques-
tion raised by Thournir, 1 13 denying the injunction upon the basis that,
although Thournir had shown irreparable harm, she had not demon-
strated a likelihood that she would prevail on the merits."14 Requests
for a mandatory stay order to both the Tenth Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court were subsequently refused."t 5 After the election,
Thournir appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The court, perJudge Carrigan,
declined to review the case, declaring that the only relief sought was the
injunction, and, since the election had already been held, the case was
moot. 16
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that it could not address the consti-
tutional issues raised by Thournir because those issues had not been
adequately argued before the federal district court. ' 17 Noting, however,
that the case presented delicate and subtle issues of constitutional law
105. 710 F.2d at 1462.
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-804(1) (1980).
107. 710 F.2d at 1462.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
111. 710 F.2d at 1462.
112. Thornir asserted that COLO. REV. STAT. § I-4-801(l)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1983) was
unconstitutional because it imposed more stringent qualification requirements upon can-
didates for Congress than those imposed by Article I, § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Consti-
tution, which states: "No person shall be Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty five years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."
113. 710 F.2d at 1462.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1462-63 (Carrigan, J., sitting by designation).
117. Id. at 1465.
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not yet settled, the court invited the appellant to "litigate the matter in
the district court if she so chooses."
' 18
V. CASE DIGESTS
A. Tenth Circuit Denies Prisoners' Right to Court Appointed Counsel
in Paternity Suits' 19
In Nordgren v. Mitchell, 120 several Utah state prison inmates who
were defendants in paternity suits brought an action claiming that the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
requires the state to provide them counsel in paternity proceedings.
The appellate court, using the analyses ordered in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services12 1 and Matthews v. Eldridge,122 determined that the state
need not provide counsel in these cases. 123 Eldridge requires a three
step evaluation in determining the need for the presence of counsel in a
court action: first, the private interest affected by the action; second, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest; and third, the govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the financial and
administrative burdens imposed. 12 4 If the Eldridge factors indicate the
need for the presence of counsel, then, under the Lassiter evaluation, this
need must be weighed against the probability that the defendant in a
suit would lose his freedom.
12 5
The Tenth Circuit, after weighing the Eldridge factors, opined that
need for the presence of counsel was indicated but ruled that the appel-
lants' likelihood of losing their freedom was minimal and, therefore,
held for the state. 126 The court reasoned that since indigence is a de-
fense against criminal non-support, there was little likelihood that any of
the appellants would lose their freedom because of a lack of counsel.1
2 7
B. Tenth Circuit Rejects Constitutional Right to Think
In Kensell v. Oklahoma,' 28 a state employee filed suit against the state
118. Id.
119. The right to counsel in student disciplinary proceedings was the sole issue before
the Tenth Circuit in Rustad v. United States Air Force, 718 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1983).
This case is analyzed extensively infra at 109.
120. 716 F.2d at 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
121. 452 U.S. 18, 25, 27 (1981).
122. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
123. 716 F.2d at 1339.
124. Id.
125. 716 F.2dat 1339 (citingLassiter, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981)). TheLassitercourtformu-
lated the test as follows:
The dispositive question . . . is whether the three Eldridge factors, when
weighed against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel in
the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty, suffice to rebut
that presumption and thus to lead to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause
requires the appointment of counsel.
452 U.S. at 31.
126. 716 F.2d at 1339.
127. Id.
128. 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983).
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of Oklahoma and several of its agencies and officials claiming a section
1983129 tort. The appellant claimed that these agencies and officials, by
not providing him a smoke-free place to work, deprived him of his right
to think. Kensell asked for damages and injunctive relief.
130
The appellant alleged that he suffered from respiratory and cardio-
vascular ailments, and that smoke interfered with his ability to think,
drawing an analogy between his case and Rogers v. Okin. 13' In Rogers,
which was subsequently vacated by the United States Supreme Court,'
3 2
patients at a Massachusetts mental hospital claimed that forcible injec-
tions of psychotropic drugs deprived them of the right to think, an ele-
ment of the right to privacy.'
3 3
The appellant also claimed that being forced to breathe smoke con-
stituted an assault, a tort actionable under section 1983, and that he was
being deprived of a property right by being forced to choose between
breathing smoke and quitting his job. Without extensive comment, the
Tenth Circuit denied the appellant's claims, observing that being forced
to breathe smoke is not analogous to being forced to take psychotropic
drugs; that no official abused his power in the case; and that appellant
had suffered no property loss because he still had his job, which he took
voluntarily, knowing that there were smokers in the workplace. 134 The
court stated that, whatever his claims for relief, the appellant could not
expect the federal judiciary to use the United States Constitution to im-
pose no-smoking rules in the workplace. To do so "would support the
most extreme expectations of the critics who fear the federal judiciary as
a superlegislature promulgating social change under the guise of secur-
ing constitutional rights."'
3 5
C. The Commerce Clause: Tenth Circuit Declares Oklahoma's Take-Over Bid
Act Unconstitutional
In 1981 Oklahoma passed the Take-Over Bid Act (the Act),
13 6
which sought to regulate tender offers made to Oklahoma "target com-
panies." As defined by the Oklahoma Act, a qualifying target company
was any company organized under Oklahoma law, or having its principal
place of business and substantial assets in Oklahoma, or having signifi-
cant operations and assets in Oklahoma, or having Oklahoma resident
shareholders controlling ten percent or more of the securities subject to
the take-over bid.' 3 7 The Oklahoma Act empowered the Administrator
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
130. 716 F.2d at 1350.
131. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
132. Id.
133. 716 F.2d at 1351.
134. Id.
135. Id. Accord Federal Employees For Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F.
Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), afd mem., 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
136. 71 OKLA. STAT. §§ 431-51 (1981).
137. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing 71
OKLA. STAT. § 433(4)(a)-(d) (1981)).
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of the Department of Securities to rule upon the adequacy of any disclo-
sure made in connection with tender offers for qualifying target compa-
nies. Thus, by the terms of the Act, the Administrator could delay or
even prohibit any tender offer involving a "target company."138
In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co.,1 3° appellees Mesa Petro-
leum (Mesa), Occidental Petroleum (Occidental), and the Bendix Cor-
poration (Bendix) sought to have the Oklahoma Act declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the commerce clause
and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.' 40 The ap-
pellees had each prevailed in separate proceedings, obtaining re-
straining orders to prevent enforcement of the Oklahoma Act.141 The
appellants, the Acting Administrator of the Oklahoma Department of
Securities, and Cities Service Company and Martin Marietta Corpora-
tion, the target companies, appealed.
The circuit court consolidated these cases on appeal because all in-
volved the same dispositive issue: "whether the Oklahoma Act violates
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution as an unreasona-
ble restraint on interstate tender offers for corporate securities."'
142
The consolidated cases all arose out of disputed tender offers. Appellee
Mesa made a cash tender offer for Cities Service, which had substantial
assets and its executive offices in Oklahoma. Subsequently, appellees
Gulf Oil and Occidental made equivalent offers for Cities Service, with
Occidental ultimately prevailing and acquiring Cities Service. 14 3 In a
separate transaction, appellee Bendix tried to acquire appellant Martin
Marietta but failed. 144 All the take-over companies followed the same
procedure: instead of filing an information statement with the state as
required by the Act, they filed successfully for temporary restraining or-
ders (TRO) with the federal district court. 14 5 Upon a hearing on the
merits, the federal district court granted permanent injunctions against
enforcement and declared the Act unconstitutional.
14 6
During this maneuvering, the United States Supreme Court struck
down a similar Illinois act147 on the grounds that it conflicted with the
Williams Act,' 4 8 and that it unnecessarily burdened interstate com-
merce. 149 The problem with the Illinois act, the Supreme Court ob-
served, was that it allowed Illinois state officials to thwart a nationwide
tender offer, even if none of the stockholders of the target company re-
138. 715 F.2d at 1427 (citing 71 OKLA. STAT. § 437 (1981)).
139. 715 F.2d at 1425 (10th Cir. 1983).
140. Id. at 1426.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1427-28.
144. Id. at 1428.
145. Id. at 1427-28.
146. Id.
147. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), where the Court found unconstitu-
tional the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch, § 1211/ (1979).
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
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sided in Illinois. 150 If the Illinois act were upheld other states could
enact similar statutes, thereby stifling "interstate commerce in securities
transactions generated by tender offers .... .151
The Tenth Circuit held that the Oklahoma Act differed from the
unconstitutional Illinois act only in "inconsequential variants of de-
gree."' 5 2 It therefore declared the Act unconstitutional.
D. Eleventh Amendment: Tenth Circuit Bars Federal Courts from Awarding
Attorney's Fees and Costs arising from State Court Proceeding.
In Wallace v. Oklahoma, 153 the appellant, attempting to collect attor-
ney's fees and costs awarded as a court-appointed counsel for an indi-
gent client, sought a writ of mandamus from the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to compel the Creek County Fund Board to pay the fees. Instead
of issuing the writ of mandamus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in its
administrative capacity ordered the county board to pay the $8500 owed
Wallace, and agreed to dismiss the suit as moot when the fees were
paid. 1 54 Again, the board did not pay. When Wallace entered a second
motion for mandamus, the board, in response to a new administrative
order from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, paid the $8500 fee. In sus-
taining the actions against the Creek County board, Wallace incurred
court costs and attorney's fees of $3000. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
denied Wallace's motion for mandamus to recover those costs.
155
In federal district court, the appellant sued the State of Oklahoma
to recover both the $3000 and the legal fees incurred by prosecuting the
federal action. 156 The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds
that under the eleventh amendment, a state is immune from suit by its
citizens when brought in federal court. 157 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The only significant point made by the appellant was that the state,
by entering into a contract with him, waived immunity. 158 The appeals
court quoted Edelman v. Jordan,159 in which the United States Supreme
150. 457 U.S. at 640-43.
151. Id. at 642.
152. 715 F.2d at 1429.
153. 721 F.2d 301 (10th Cir. 1983).
154. Id. at 302.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The eleventh amendment provides that: "The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state." This amendment has been construed to preclude suits in federal court
against a state by citizens of that state. 721 F.2d at 303 (citing Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974)); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487
(10th Cir. 1983)).
158. As a preliminary matter, the Tenth Circuit stated that the Federal Question Juris-
dictional Amendments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), "should be applied retroactively to
cases pending on appeal." 721 F.2d at 303 (citing Morris v. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, 702 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Eikenberry v. Calla-
han, 653 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); cf Andrus v. Charleston Stone Prods.
Co., 436 U.S. 604, 607-08 n.6 (1978)).
159. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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Court held that a waiver exists only "where stated 'by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will]
leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' 1160 Finding
neither an express waiver nor implication of a waiver, the appeals court
rejected the appellant's argument.' 6 1 In dicta the court noted that, even
if the state did waive immunity, that waiver should not be extended to
Oklahoma's immunity under the eleventh amendment absent an express
indication of legislative intent. Without this express waiver, "recovery
must emanate from the state forum."'
16 2
James Peter Cooksey
160. Id. at 673 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray
v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909))).
161. 721 F.2d at 306.
162. Id. at 305 (citing Nichols v. Department of Corrections, 631 P.2d 746, 748-51
(Okla. 1981)).
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